Never turn recovery material into a support credential

A recovery phrase or private key is not a password reset token. Anyone who receives it can usually reconstruct signing authority. Legitimate support workflows should never require it, and security processes should assume any disclosed recovery material is permanently compromised.

This concept matters because Never type a seed phrase into a website presented as support.

Seed phrases deterministically reconstruct signing authority and therefore cannot be scoped like a password reset token.

Identify whether the workflow requests recovery words or raw signing material.

At protocol and execution level, inspect seed phrase and derived key and signer and backup and compromise. Protocol identifiers remain untranslated because they are part of the technical payload.

Entering a seed into a support portal gives the requester durable authority over all derived wallets.

The practical consequence is that A leaked seed cannot be made secret again. Unknown is not equivalent to safe.

• seed typed into website
• seed photographed/cloud-synced
• support asks for recovery words
• same seed used in insecure environment
• suspected disclosure without migration

Never disclose; if already entered, migrate assets from a known-clean environment.

The practical consequence is that A leaked seed cannot be made secret again.

Escalate when evidence is contradictory, incomplete or the consequence exceeds routine policy.

Verify the request through independent evidence before irreversible authorization.

1. 01

   classify recovery material

2. 02

   remove online copies

3. 03

   verify signer never exports secrets

4. 04

   design recovery test

5. 05

   migrate assets after suspected exposure